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Based on Brownian ratchets, a counter-intuitive phenomenon has recently emerged – namely,
that two losing games can yield, when combined, a paradoxical tendency to win. A restriction of
this phenomenon is that the rules depend on the current capital of the player. Here we present new
games where all the rules depend only on the history of the game and not on the capital. This new
history-dependent structure significantly increases the parameter space for which the effect operates.
In the early 1990’s it was shown that a Brownian par-
ticle in a periodic and asymmetric potential moves to
the right (say) in a systematic way when the potential is
switched on and off, either periodically or randomly [1,2].
This so-called flashing ratchet is in the class of phe-
nomena known as Brownian ratchets [3]. The flashing
ratchet can be viewed as the combination of two dynam-
ics: Brownian motion in an asymmetric potential and
Brownian motion on a flat potential. In each of these
two cases, the particle does not exhibit any systematic
motion. However, when they are alternated the particle
moves to the right. The effect persists even if we add a
uniform external force pointing to the left. In that case,
the two dynamics discussed above yield motion to the
left but when they are combined, the particle moves to
the right.
It has recently been shown, in the seminal papers [4–7],
that a discrete-time version of the flashing ratchet can
be interpreted as simple gambling games. Here we have
two losing games which become winning when combined.
These games are the simplest situation of a paradoxical
mechanism which, we believe, can be present in many
situations of interest. The apparent paradox points out
that if one combines two dynamics in which a given vari-
able decreases the same variable can increase in the re-
sulting dynamics. Examples of related phenomena in-
clude enzyme transport analyzed by a four-state rate
model [8], finance models where capital grows by in-
vesting in an asset with negative typical growth rate [9],
stability produced by combining unstable systems [10],
counter-intuitive drift in the physics of granular flow [11],
the combination of declining branching processes produc-
ing an increase [12] and counter-intuitive drift in switched
diffusion processes in random media [13].
The games originally described in [4–7] are expressed
in terms of tossing biased coins. The games rely on a
state-dependent rule based on the player’s capital and
two losing games can surprisingly combine to win. This
effect was shown to be essentially a discrete-time Brow-
nian ratchet [4]. This is of interest to information the-
orists who have long studied the problem of producing
a fair game from biased coins [14] and winning games
from fair games [15], inspired by the work of von Neu-
mann [16] – the games we are discussing go a step further,
demonstrating a winning expectation produced from los-
ing games and have recently been analyzed from the point
of view of information theory [17]. Seigman [18,19] has
reinterpreted the capital of the games in terms of elec-
tron occupancies in energy levels, recasting the problem
in terms of rate equations. Similarly, Van den Broeck et
al [7] have likened the analysis of the transition probabili-
ties of the games to Onsager’s treatment of reaction rates
in circular chemical reactions [20]. It has been suggested
in [6] that an area of interest to quantum information
theory would be to recast the games in term of quantum
probability amplitudes along the lines of [21–23]. Quan-
tum ratchets have now been experimentally realised [24]
and thus quantum game theory based on ratchets is of
interest.
However, one of the limitations the game paradox and
its applicability to further situations is that it relies on a
modulo rule based on the capital of the player. The mod-
ulo arithmetic rule is quite natural for an interpretation
of the paradox in terms of energy levels, say, however
for processes in biology and biophysics it is unnatural.
Applicability of the paradox to population genetics, evo-
lution and economics has been suggested [25] and thus a
desirable version of the paradox would be to have rules
independent of capital.
In this letter we present a new interpretation of the
paradox in terms of good and bad biased coins which
are played more or less often when the two games are
combined. This interpretation allows us to introduce an
important modification to the original games, namely,
games which do not depend on the capital but only on
the recent history of wins and loses.
The two original games are as follows. The player has
some capital X(t), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . In game A the capital
is increased by one with probability p and decreased by
one with probability 1− p. In game B, the rules are:
Prob. of win Prob. of loss
X(t)/3 ∈ Z p1 1− p1
X(t)/3 /∈ Z p2 1− p2
Here “win” means increasing the capital by one and
“loss” decreasing it by one. For the choice, p = 1/2− ǫ,
1
p1 = 1/10 − ǫ, and p2 = 3/4 − ǫ, with ǫ > 0, the two
games have a tendency to lose. More precisely 〈X(t)〉 is
a decreasing function of the number of runs t. However, if
in each run we randomly choose the game we play, then,
for ǫ small enough, 〈X(t)〉 is an increasing function of t.
An explanation of this paradox is as follows. First, let
us imagine the above rules as implemented by three bi-
ased coins, A, B1 and B2, with probability for tails p,
p1 and p2, respectively. We see that A and B1 are “bad
coins,” whereas B2 is a “good coin” for the player. When
game B is played alone, at first sight one would say that
B1 is used one third of the time. However, this is not the
case. When the capital is multiple of three, X(t) = 3n,
there is a high probability of losing, i.e., X(t+1) = 3n−1
is the most likely value for the capital at t + 1. If this
is the case, we have to use coin B2 in the t + 1 run
and the most likely outcome is now a win. Therefore,
the most likely capital at t + 2 is again X(t + 2) = 3n.
We see that the probability of X(t) being multiple of
three is bigger than 1/3, due to the very rules of game B.
The precise value of the equilibrium probability can be
calculated by defining the Markov process Y (t) ≡ X(t)
mod 3, which only takes on three values, Y (t) = 0, 1, 2.
The stationary distribution for Y (t), when ǫ = 0 is given
by: π0 =
5
13
; π1 =
2
13
; π2 =
6
13
. The fairness of the
game is indicated by π0p1 + (π1 + π2)p2 = 1/2.
When coin A comes to play, the stationary distribution
changes. For instance, if games A and B are switched at
random, one has: π′0 =
245
709
; π′1 =
180
709
; π′2 =
284
709
. The
game is no longer fair because π′
0
= 245/709 = 0.346 is
closer to 1/3 than π0 = 0.385, for the “bad coin” and now
the “good coin,” B2, is played more often than before.
The effect persists even if coin A is bad, leading to the
paradox.
This interpretation helps us to find a new version of
the paradox with capital independent games. Game A is
the same as before and we introduce game B′ which is
played with four coins: B′
1
, B′
2
, B′
3
, and B′
4
. Which coin
is used now depends on the history of the game:
Before last Last Coin Prob. of win Prob. of loss
t− 2 t− 1 at t at t
loss loss B′
1
p1 1− p1
loss win B′
2
p2 1− p2
win loss B′3 p3 1− p3
win win B′
4
p4 1− p4
This is in fact the most general game depending on the
outcome of the two last runs. The paradox could even be
reproduced with this type of game if the “bad” coins in
game B′ are played more often than what is expected in
a completely random game, ie. one quarter of the time.
Notice that the capitalX(t) in game B′ is not a Marko-
vian process. However, one can define the vector
Y (t) =
(
X(t)−X(t− 1)
X(t− 1)−X(t− 2)
)
(1)
which can take four values (±1,±1), and does form a
Markov chain. The transition probabilities are easily
obtained from the rules of game B′. Let π1(t), π2(t),
π3(t) and π4(t) be the probabilities that Y (t) is (−1,−1),
(1,−1), (−1, 1), and (1, 1), respectively. The proba-
bility distribution ~π(t) verifies the evolution equation:
~π(t + 1) = A~π(t), where the matrix A is given by the
transition probabilities and reads:
A =


1− p1 0 1− p3 0
p1 0 p3 0
0 1− p2 0 1− p4
0 p2 0 p4

 . (2)
The stationary distribution ~πst of this Markov chain is
by definition invariant under the action of the matrix A,
i.e., ~πstA = ~πst. This distribution reads:
~πst =
1
N


(1 − p3)(1− p4)
(1− p4)p1
(1− p4)p1
p1p2

 (3)
where N is a normalization constant.
In the stationary regime, the probability to win in a
generic run is:
pwin =
4∑
i=1
πst,ipi =
p1(p2 + 1− p4)
(1− p4)(2p1 + 1− p3) + p1p2
(4)
which can be rewritten as pwin = 1/(2 + c/s), with
s = p1(p2 + 1 − p4) > 0 for any choice of the rules,
and c = (1− p4)(1 − p3)− p1p2.
Therefore, the tendency of game B′ obeys the follow-
ing rule: if c < 0, B′ is winning; if c = 0, B′ is fair;
and if c > 0, B′ is losing. Again, here losing, winning
and fair means that 〈X(t)〉 is, respectively, a decreasing,
increasing or constant function of t.
Since when game B′ is combined with game A the vec-
tor Y (t) as defined in Eq. (1) is still a Markov chain, the
same procedure applies. The probabilities of winning are
now replaced by p′i = (pi + p)/2. Summarizing, to re-
produce the paradox with capital independent games we
have to find a set of five numbers, p and pi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4),
such that
1− p > p
(1− p4)(1 − p3) > p1p2
(2− p4 − p)(2 − p3 − p) < (p1 + p)(p2 + p), (5)
where the third equation is just the second with p′i and
the inequality reversed (to make the combined game win-
ning instead of losing).
One of the coins in game B′ must be “bad” and used
more often than one quarter of the time. It cannot be
either B′1 or B
′
4 because the probability of using these
coins depends on whether the game is losing or win-
ning (if B′1 is played more often than B
′
4, it is obvi-
ous that the game is losing). The bad coins should be
2
B′
2
and B′
3
. Let us set p = 1/2 − ǫ, p1 = 9/10 − ǫ,
p2 = p3 = 1/4− ǫ, and p4 = 7/10− ǫ. With these num-
bers, one can see that the two first inequalities in Eq. (5)
are always satisfied if ǫ > 0, whereas the third is sat-
isfied if ǫ < 1/168 = 0.00595 – ie. the paradox occurs
when 0 < ǫ < 1/168, for our chosen parameter set in this
example.
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FIG. 1. Evolution of capital with play. The lower two
curves show that games A and B′ lose when individually
played. [2,2] indicates game A played 2 times followed by
game B′ played 2 times and so on. The top curve indicates
random switching between games A and B′. Capital surpris-
ingly increases in the random or periodic cases. Simulations
are carried out with ǫ = 0.003, with averaging over 500 000
ensembles. p = 1/2 − ǫ, p1 = 9/10 − ǫ, p2 = p3 = 1/4 − ǫ,
and p4 = 7/10 − ǫ. There are four possible initial conditions
—these affect the offsets but not the slopes— all the above
curves are the average of the four cases
The simulation in Fig. 1 shows that as games A and
B′ evolve individually the capital declines, as expected
(ie. they are losing games). On the same graph we see the
remarkable result that when A and B′ are alternated ei-
ther randomly or periodically, the capital now increases.
This reproduces the paradoxical behavior first observed
in the original games [4], but now without state depen-
dence on capital. The slopes of the curves corresponding
to game B′ and to the random combination can easily
be calculated as: 〈X(t+ 1)〉 − 〈X(t)〉 = 2pwin − 1, with
pwin given by Eq. (4). The old and new games have a
fundamental difference in that the old ones can be inter-
preted in terms of a random walk in a periodic environ-
ment (RWPE) [19] or a Brownian particle in a periodic
potential, whereas the rules of the present games are ho-
mogeneous. We could say that the periodic structure of
the original games has been transferred to the memory of
the rules in the new games. Therefore, the paradox needs
at least one of these two ingredients: inhomogeneity or
non-markovianity [26].
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FIG. 2. Value of capital after 500 games. Games A and B′
are periodically mixed. Game A is played a times, followed
by B′ played b times and so on. Games are played with ǫ=0
and 500 000 ensemble averages have been taken. p = 1/2,
p1 = 9/10, p2 = p3 = 1/4, and p4 = 7/10.
Consider now a periodic combination of games A and
B′. Fig. 2 shows the capital after 500 games – where
game A is played a times and game B′ is played b times.
We can observe that the resulting capital is greater when
the games are switched more frequently. This behavior
agrees with with that of the original games [4]. Note that
in Fig. 2 changing the value of ǫ only affects the vertical
capital displacement, thus setting ǫ = 0 pushes the graph
into the positive region.
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FIG. 3. Parameter space for game B′ when p=1/2. We see
there are four volumes labelled Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4, bounded
by the inequalities in Eq. (5). The paradox of two losing
games that win if randomly combined, occurs if the param-
eters lie within the volumes marked Q1 and Q3. In regions
Q2 and Q4 the reverse effect occurs where games A and B
are individually winning, but the randomized combination is
losing.
For the randomized games, we can now observe the
volume of parameter space for which the paradox takes
effect, by plotting the surfaces that represent the bound-
aries of the inequalities in Eq. (5). This is shown in Fig. 3,
where for convenience we have set p2 = p3 to produce the
3
graph in three variables. The volumes enclosed by the
surfaces marked Q1, . . ., Q4 are the regions of parameter
space for which the paradox takes effect. Regions Q1 and
Q3 are where two losing games combine to win. On the
other hand, Q2 and Q4 represent the reverse effect where
two winning games combine to lose. This conjugate re-
gion can be simply thought of in terms of changing the
sign of the capital, so that the perspective of the con-
cepts ‘win’ and ‘lose’ reverse. This was observed in the
original capital-dependent games [27], however the conju-
gate regions were symmetrical. What is now interesting
is that the new history-dependent games have asymmet-
rical conjugate regions, as can be seen in Fig. 3.
Another important comparison between the new
history-dependent games and the original capital-
dependent games is that the volume of parameter space
is now bigger. A numerical mesh analysis on Fig. 3 re-
vealed that the new games have a parameter space about
50 times larger than the original games reported in [27].
For applications such as in biophysics, it is important
to find such gaming models with large and hence robust
parameter spaces. Although it appears that the rates of
winning from the slopes of Fig. 1 are about factor of 2
lower than the original games, this is only the case for the
particular chosen parameters. The 50 times increase in
parameter space is favorable for applications in modeling
evolutionary processes in biology, for example, where a
weak pay-off can gradually accumulate over a long period
of time.
In summary, we have shown that the apparently para-
doxical effect where two losing games can cooperate to
win does work with a history based state-dependent rule
rather than the original restriction of a modulo capital
based state-dependence. This, together with an increased
parameter space opens up the phenomenon to a wider
range of possible application areas. This suggests that fu-
ture investigation of further types of history-based rules
and other types of state dependencies may be fruitful.
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